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Abstract. Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures (AAIs) support 
service providers on the internet to outsource security services. Motivations for 
their usage stem from software engineering and economics. For the latter an 
assessment of inherent risks is needed. In this work the authors deduct an 
appropriate, formalistic risk assessment method for AAIs and analyse outsource 
able security services in comparison to traditional – non AAI involved – service 
providing. To achieve the assessment of risks various methods for risk 
management have been analysed and finally a suitable qualitative method has 
been chosen. As AAIs differ in their potential to cover security services, 
combinations of these services are compared. The given risk assessment method 
enables providers to decide on a special infrastructure for their purpose and lets 
users of AAIs determine if given advantages surpass the immanent risks. This 
work also enables service providers to estimate costs for such an infrastructure 
and calculate potential savings.  
1   Introduction 
Service providing on the internet has been a huge success story. Although ease of use 
is proclaimed in many advertisements, the usage of a service on the internet – e.g. to 
buy a book or to use a geographic routing service – is not trivial at all. The purchase 
of a book is not simply a link to click on but it stands at the end of a sequel of security 
and data intensive processes – most of them hidden from the user. The complexity of 
doing business over the internet has increased both for customers and vendors. 
Concentrating on security connected processes we find a chain of distinctive services 
linking the user’s request with the service providing as shown in Fig. 1. The given 
chain of security services is enhanced by an attribute infrastructure like deduced from 
OASIS’ XACML and SAML standards in [14]. 
Risk is an omnipresent factor in internet transactions. Risks have to be identified 
and valuated to decide upon appropriate controls and monitoring mechanisms. 
Basically, one has the options to either avoid, reduce, shift, or accept a certain risk.  
In [14] and [15] it is argued that Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures 
(AAIs) can be used to source out security services in order for the service provider to 
concentrate on core competencies, raise the overall level of security, provide new, 
flexible, and more powerful access control services like ABAC (attribute-based 
access control), and strengthen the usability through user’s Single Sign-On (SSO). 
However, the usage of a new architecture, especially if not entirely under the control 
of a service provider, raises questions about risk assessment in comparison to 
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traditional methods of service providing on the internet. The authors show that 
different approaches to AAIs are available each with inherent benefits and 
shortcomings. Differences result from the architecture, the level of outsourcing, and 
specific use cases.  
 
Fig. 1. Security services for accessing a resource in an attribute enhanced infrastructure 
In this paper we identify and measure risk factors in traditional e-commerce 
surroundings versus e-commerce applications with an AAI. Although AAIs are by 
nature generic architectures, e-commerce has been taken as an example.  
2   Related Work 
The topic of AAIs as a tool for service providers on the internet has been discussed on 
a technical level by [9], making a comparative survey, and in more detail by [15] in 
2005. Various architectures of research projects and products have been analysed and 
motivation for the parties has been given: e.g. [14] proposed a reference architecture 
for an AAI respecting privacy and flexibility. The idea of Single Sign-On has been 
discussed in the field of identity management. A classification of architectures can be 
seen in [5]. A quite technical paper by [7] has analysed the risks in the Microsoft 
Passport protocol. All work that can be found today on AAIs, the most recent given 
here, has so far neglected the risk assessment in these architectures in comparison to 
traditional service providing.  
That risk in e-commerce is immanent is being reported regularly by intelligence 
agencies, other governmental institutions, or the media. The interested reader is 
pointed to [6] for a survey of general risks in e-business. 
Risk management techniques have become a vital element of modern security 
management. A risk is an unwanted event that has negative consequences [12] and 
can be described as the “combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence”. 
Systematic risk assessment is especially helpful when it comes to the economic 
evaluation of information security investments [11]. In literature and in practice 
numerous methodologies and frameworks for conducting risk analyses exist [17]. 
Virtually all of today's existing approaches use qualitative metrics to assess risks. 
Quantification is regarded an important issue but due to many challenges in this field 
there is, to our knowledge, no methodology for our purpose up until now. Thus we are 
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going to use a qualitative scale. The concept of Annual Loss Expectancy has a long 
tradition in risk management and is the basis for the Return on Security Investment.  
[2] and [4] pointed out that a holistic cost-benefit evaluation of security 
investments should also consider the motivation and possible return for an attacker.  
3   Methodology  
To correctly and completely assess risks in e-commerce or internet transactions, one 
has to follow a structured approach to fully comprehend and expose all relevant 
aspects. As shown in section 2, several procedures are known. The authors have opted 
for [13] with slight adoptions. Risks distinguish themselves from other events due to a 
loss associated with the event, a measurable frequency of the occurrence, and by a 
chance to change the outcome of the event. Consequently we are going to divide the 
holistic process of accessing a resource into separate steps, distinguishing between 
several forms of implementation for different architectures. We measure the impact 
for the stakeholders and the according frequency. Finally, we evaluate architectural 
decisions on their impact and suggest, based on the risk assessment on the pros and 
cons, the usage of an AAI. The Return on Security Investment (RoSI) is used to 
economically justify an AAI usage. 
Let li be the frequency of a successful attack on i in one year. Li is defined as the 
expected loss for i in the case of a successful attack. Consequently, the Annual Loss 
Expectancy for i is defined as  
iii LlALE ⋅=  (1) 
4   AAI Architectures 
Usually, the usage of AAIs is motivated from a software engineering point of view – 
outsourcing non functional activities into an infrastructure [16], and from an economic 
point - outsourcing security services to concentrate on core competencies gaining 
competitive advantages and raising the security level through third party know-how 
[15]. Referring back to Fig. 1 we see that several security services build on each other 
to compute an access decision. Again, taken the SAML and XACML termini as a 
guideline, we can deduct four separate steps of services: Authentication Assertion, 
Attribute Assertion, Policy Decision Assertion, and Policy Enforcement. One, all of 
them, or combinations can be outsourced by a Service Provider into an AAI.  
The characteristics of an AAI can be determined with the help of the given four 
sub-services in combination with the two prevailing architectural paradigms. AAIs are 
to this day build either centrally with a central database or provider in the middle or as 
a federation where service providers act as AAI providers themselves. The best 
examples of these two archetypes are of course Microsoft’s centralised .NET Passport 
versus the distributed Liberty Identity Federation Framework.  
In this paper we restrict the introduction of current AAIs to four representatives, 
each enhancing the other by or specialising in one of the given sub-services. For a 
more detailed analyses see [14, 15]. 
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4.1   Microsoft .NET Passport 
Microsoft .NET Passport, although often criticised, was the first and the largest 
commercial AAI so far. Passport concentrates on Single Sign-On (SSO) for the user 
who gets his passport account with every hotmail account, using a central database to 
keep all client information. Passport relies heavily on the usage of cookies imitating 
to some extend Kerberos’s ticketing functionalities. The login to a SP is redirected to 
Passport requiring his username and password. The SP’s ID is transmitted via URL 
encoding enabling Passport to redirect the client and storing several cookies. At the 
SP a software agent is needed – the so called Passport-Manager. This software reads 
URL encoded data and stores additional cookies into the SP’s domain permitting an 
access control decision. At another vendor the passport cookies are used to enable a 
SSO [10]. The vendor decides about access of resources using his authorisation and 
access control mechanism of choice. Passport is a centrally organised SSO system 
meaning that it only asserts the user’s authentication. 
4.2   Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF) 
Liberty was the open source community’s answer to Microsoft Passport in 2001. In 
Liberty a Circle of Trust (CoT) establishes a Liberty system [8]. Each partner 
provides the authentication for his users with his own methods while they themselves 
can login to all other partners with a SSO. The user authenticates at his IdP and, if he 
wishes, a cookie is stored under a common domain where every member hosts a 
server so they all can access the cookie. If a user moves to a CoT member the cookie 
is read, the IdP asks for appropriate authentication, and an assertion is awaited. 
Communication is based on the SAML protocol. A CoT has to decide on the 
implementations. The SAML assertions can carry any attribute the CoT agrees upon. 
Liberty’s architecture is distributed. The IdP is not fixed like in Shibboleth or 
centralised like in Microsoft .NET Passport. It is possible to login at different points 
of the CoT thus resulting e.g. in different user names or attributes that are transferred. 
The identity of the user is not revealed in the process of requests and assertions. For 
risk assessment purposes we call Liberty identity and attribute federated.  
4.3   PERMIS 
The EU project PERMIS [3] is closely integrated into the target system. This can be 
e.g. an apache web server. Instead of using the apache security functionality PERMIS 
is used to derive the user’s role names and a PERMIS policy used to control access. 
The target application is responsible for user authentication. PERMIS uses X.509 
attribute certificates (AC) binding the user’s distinguished name to a role. An XML 
policy authorises roles and targets. If a user desires access the PERMIS access control 
enforcement function will delegate his request to the access control decision function 
which determines the correctness of the AC and its compliance with the policy. If 
access is granted the decision is given back to the enforcement function which grants 
the access or not. The centrally stored ACs can contain any information an Attribute 
Authority has assigned. Of course different authorities can work together creating an 
attribute storage LDAP. The decision and enforcement functions have to be 
implemented into the web server at the SP.  
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4.4   PAPI 
PAPI (Point of Access to Providers of Information), developed in 2001 by RedIRIS, a 
Spanish research network, could be regarded as a maximised AAI. It forms a 
distributed access control system for digital resources accessible over an institution’s 
intranet or the internet. The user has to authenticate at the authentication server (AS) 
of his home domain. As PAPI is agnostic to the form of authentication the user’s 
domain is responsible to supply a distinguish name. After successful authentication a 
website is given back to the user containing all accessible digital resources. Clicking 
on a link, the user is redirected to the Point of Access (PoA) taking with him an 
encrypted key identifying the AS. The PoA fetches the resource and delivers it to the 
user. PAPI acts as a proxy server and handles all interaction for the associated clients 
and servers. Consequentially, PAPI forms the maximal AAI [1].  
5   Risk Identification 
Assets under risk are the identities of clients and service providers, attributes about 
resources and users, the service or the good requested, as well as the system itself. All 
assets are prone to loose the three major security goals: Integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability. [13] has shown the types of vulnerabilities one might find for hardware, 
software, and data. Adopting that notion, the vulnerabilities are interruption, for 
example via a Denial-of-Service-attack, interception of the communication, for 
example via a Man-in-the-Middle-attack, the modification of the asset, for example 
attributes granting access to the resource only if the user is over 18 could be changed 
to access under 16, and finally fabrication of new identities. Fabrication would occur 
if a bogus merchant is created luring the client to log-in with his SSO credentials.  
To assess the risk of each asset we make use of the introduced frequency for a 
successful attack. The frequency is affected twofoldly – firstly by the technical barrier 
T one raises to prevent an attack and secondly by the motivation of the attacker, the so 
called “return of attack” – RoA.  
),( iii RoATfl =  (2) 
iiii LRoATfALE ⋅= ),(  (3) 
The higher T the less likely a successful attack occurs; the higher RoA the higher 
the attacker’s motivation and the resources employed and consequently the likelier an 
attack. The RoA can be seen as more or less stable as a service provider per se is 
doing business by offering something of value. He will not stop providing services to 
minimise risks. However, T is completely in the hands of the service provider. 
Outsourcing security services to an AAI can inflect on T and therefore on the 
frequency of a successful attack.  
If the outsourcing of security services inflects the ALE the question remains which 
security services should be outsourced and to what extent. Different AAI approaches 
and architectures are able to perform one, all, or combinations of these services. We 
will take each sub-service and analyse the risks associated as can be seen in Table 1. 
Each sub-service can be interrupted via a Denial of Service or the deletion of its data. 
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Table 1. Security sub-services with associated risks and consequences  
Service Risks for user Risks for provider 
Authenti-
cation 
Assertion 
Identity theft: Identity is 
intercepted and/or misused. 
Provider’s identity is forged and 
the user lured into signing-in or 
paying for services never to be 
received. 
Identity theft: User identity is forged 
or intercepted resulting in delivery 
without access rights. The theft of the 
provider’s identity results in a loss of 
reputation. 
Attribute 
Assertion 
Attribute forging or 
modification: If resource 
attributes are modified, not 
complete, or added, the following 
decision can’t be trusted. It might 
be that access or privileges are not 
granted.  
Attribute interception: A bogus 
merchant could use the attributes 
to misuse credentials like a credit 
card number, conduct illegal 
profiling, or sell the information. 
Attribute forging or modification: If 
user attributes are modified, not 
complete, or added, the following 
decision can’t be trusted. False denies 
result in loss of business or user 
motivation to change the provider. 
False access can be used for fraud. 
Attribute interception: an attacker 
could gain secret knowledge about 
processes or products. 
Policy 
Decision 
Assertion 
Decision forging or modification: 
Access could be wrongly denied. 
Decision forging or modification: 
Access could be wrongly denied or 
granted.  
Policy 
Enforcement
Enforcement modification: 
Access could be wrongly denied. 
Enforcement modification: Access 
could be wrongly denied or granted.  
As the effect is devastating but trivial - no provider or user can conduct business – it 
is not shown explicitly. 
5.1   General Implications of AAI Usage 
With the usage of an AAI various changes occur in the business surrounding. For 
once, the potential number of customers for one provider enlarges. The number of 
users of an AAI that merges N service providers is at most the sum of all users (4). 
∑
=
≤ N
i
iAAI nn 1  (4) 
The technical barrier for an attack T is no longer just one single Ti but has to be 
seen as a combination of all barriers for the given sub-services, each potentially 
outsourced: AuthNiT  - for the Authentication, 
Attrib
iT  - for the Attribute Services, 
PD
iT  - for the Policy Decision, and 
PE
iT  - for the Policy Enforcement. iT can’t be 
computed by the sum of all barriers but is determined by the minimum: the weakest 
link in the chain determines its overall strength (5). 
),,,min( PEiPDiAttribiAuthNii TTTTT =  (5) 
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5.2   AAI Architectures and Their Implications 
If using an AAI like Microsoft’s .NET Passport the authentication of the user is 
relayed to Passport. The provider uses Passport’s technical barrier to prevent misuse 
of the authentication sub-service for his business. His ALEi, consequently, depends on 
the following equation (6): 
ii
PE
i
PD
i
Attrib
i
AuthN
AAIi LRoATTTTfALE ⋅= )),,,,(min(  (6) 
Using PERMIS TAttrib and TPD depend on the AAI. TAuthN has to be managed by the SP 
or another AAI providing SSO. The enforcement needs to be handled by the target 
system. 
For one single provider the loss and supplied return of attack stays the same. 
However, in the case of a fully developed AAI – like in PAPI – where all security 
services are outsourced and the AAI provider acts as a proxy for all N service 
providers, a successful attack on one security service results in a breach of all N 
vendors. Ti is substituted by TPAPI. The AAI resembles a middleman. Consequently, 
the RoA is the sum of all returns (7). 
i
N
i iPAPIi
LRoATfALE ⋅= ∑
=
),(
1
 
(7) 
(6) is true if the barrier T is set by one AAI provider like Passport, PERMIS, or 
PAPI. However, if the AAI is distributed like the Liberty ID-FF the technical barrier 
can’t be estimated as easily. As N SPs act also as identity and attribute providers for 
other SPs in a CoT and use their own means of authentication the notion of the 
weakest link once more takes effect (8): 
ii
PE
i
PD
i
Attrib
N
AttribAuthN
N
AuthN
i
LRoATT
TTTTfALE
⋅
=
)),,
),,...,min(),,...,(min(min( 11
 
(8) 
Please note that although no AAI is introduced in detail here having a federated 
policy decision of this type is also possible.  
6   Towards Risk Assessment in AAIs 
To correctly assess the risk of the usage of an AAI the authors make use of a 
qualitative method. As the Annual Loss Expectancy ALE in an AAI for SPi is, with 
the exception of a proxy approach, independent of his Li and RoAi, one can narrow the 
effect to the technical barrier of the security sub-service (5), (6). The technical 
barriers of the four sub-services, when provided by SPi himself, are taken as the 
normalised value. The outsourced value TAAI is either more (+), less (-), or equal (~). 
Table 2 states the risk assessment. A distinction is being made if the sub-service is 
federated or centralised. 
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Table 2. Risk assessment for service providers in AAIs 
 TAAI, centralised TAAI, federated 
TA
ut
hN
 
+: Although nAAI exceeds ni, the potential 
of granting SSO with a hard password in a 
controlled environment argues for a 
stronger authentication. The usage of 
complex identification methods like a PKI 
is more preferable. 
-: As SPi is in no control of all other SP 
the weakest link in the chain dictates the 
barrier for identity theft and alike. A 
controlled, standardised approach for 
each SP is not mandatory. 
TA
ttr
ib
 
+: Merging all attributes balances modified 
or forged information. With a pattern of 
the user’s behaviour suspicious behaviour 
can be detected. 
+: Same as centralised approach. 
TP
D
 
+: Centralised policy decision enables 
complex, flexible, and specialised access 
control like XACML policies through 
synergies and a broader information base. 
~/-: As policy decision making has to be 
provided by every SP no synergies can 
be utilised. The weakest method sets the 
highest barrier for attacks. 
TP
E  
-: The usage of a central proxy strongly 
affects the potential RoA resulting in a 
higher li (PAPI, (7)). 
Not feasible. 
Identity theft and fraud are the user’s two main concerns in e-commerce. Assuming 
the SP himself is acting trustworthy, an attacker could only harm the user if a 
technical barrier fails. Consequently, the user has a strong interest in high security but 
is in no position of influencing the barriers directly. An exception has to be made as 
far as the authentication is concerned. Using weak passwords is making identity theft 
easy. SPs usually shy at demanding strong passwords or the usage of a PKI, fearing 
increased help desk costs or shrinking user acceptance. With a SSO these 
disadvantages could be reduced. However, the user has to trust the IdP not to misuse 
his data. The discussion about .Net Passport and the development of the Liberty ID-
FF shows an interest in privacy and missing user acceptance. A user has to evaluate 
privacy aspects versus the ease of use through SSO and a potentially higher and 
transparent security system.  
7   Methods for Deciding on AAI Usage 
In section 6 we have assessed risks depending on different AAI structures and 
services. The question remains whether an AAI is economically useful.  
To determine the cost effectiveness of security investments the RoSI approach has 
been widely accepted. ALEold depicts the expected loss without additional security 
investment. C are security costs to reach ALEnew, R is additional revenue in cause of 
the membership in an AAI Federation, e.g. through wider adoption of the service, a 
larger customer base, or a better corporate image. 
RoSIRCALEALE newold =+−−  (9) 
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For economic reasons the RoSI must be at least positive. Taking into consideration 
that ALE is defined by the weakest point of the security sub-services Tmin and that the 
cost for sub-service x at SPi is 
x
ic  we can deduct two reasons for outsourcing security 
sub-services. xir  defines the additional revenue for SPi when outsourcing x due to the 
reasons mentioned above. 
First, if the outsourced sub-service xiT is not 
minT  but xAAI
x
i TT ≤ , then 
0=Δ=− ALEALEALE newold  from (9) 
0≥+− RC  →  RC ≤  →  xi
x
i
x
AAI rcc +≤  
(10) 
Meaning that if no strengthened barrier against an attack results out of the decision 
to use the AAI’s service it can be economically reasonable to use the AAI if cost-
savings are higher or additional revenue is gained for example through a larger 
customer base. 
Second, if the outsourced sub-service xiT is 
minT  and xAAI
x
i TT ≤ , then 
0>Δ=− ALEALEALE newold  from (9) 
ALErcc xi
x
i
x
AAI Δ++<  
(11) 
The amount to be invested in an AAI is the sum of reduced costs through 
outsourcing, additional revenue through a larger customer base, and the saved ALE. 
Please note, when changing more than one sub-service in (11) the additional revenue 
x
ir  is not affected proportionally. 
Using AAI services does not automatically change the risk assessment of a 
business process. As seen in Table 2 the decision has to be carefully evaluated if 
additional risks are worth the enhancements. Furthermore, the decision of outsourcing 
doesn’t have to depend on risk but can be seen as an entirely economic decision (10). 
However, as shown in (11) the implication of fewer risks – or lesser ALE - 
motivates higher investments for the AAI usage as well as sums up to potential 
savings.  
8   Conclusion and Future Work 
Unfortunately, empirical data about the risks of AAIs is missing. Therefore, our 
approach stays conceptual and follows the qualitative methods by [13]. However, our 
approach permits, for the first time, the analysis of risks in each sub-service in 
authentication, authorisation, and access control deducting formally the factors which 
are influencing an outsourcing decision. Exclusively motivating AAIs from a technical 
perspective is not sufficient. It is of high importance to identify the four security sub-
services for a system and measure its costs and risks. Accordingly, a service provider 
can decide on a suitable AAI. Next steps have to comprise the search for empirical data. 
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